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Dimensions of the New Urban Revival
Urbanisation patterns in the United States have taken some unlikely turns over the past quarter of a century. After following fairly predictable trends in the 1950s and 1960s towards increased urban growth and westward movement, the nation experienced a 1970s 'counter-urbanisation' similar to that which occurred in many other developed countries (Champion, 1989; 1992) . In the US, counter-urbanisation was associated with several redistribution reversals that were linked to both metropolitan size and region of the country. In assessing these reversals at great length, Frey and Speare (1988) concluded that the 1970s was a "transition decade" for population redistribution in the US. However, the term 'transition' did not refer as much to the specific geographical patterns of redistribution that had emerged, as it did to the changing social and economic contexts for urban and regional growth. The changing national industrial structure, the rise of the global economy and improvements in communications and production technologies, have changed the geography of opportunities across space and the ability of populations to respond to these changes. At the same time, the diffusion of 'urban' amenities to all parts of the country-including areas previously considered to be remote or rural-has expanded the location options for both employers and residents. More so than in the past, the population and economic growth of regions, metropolitan areas and small places are dependent on how successfully these areas can adapt to rapidly changing circumstances.
Despite the realisation that the contexts for urban and regional redistribution had been altered, there was little consensus among scholars as to the form of urbanisation that would emerge in the 1980s and 1990s. With findings from the 1990 US census now in hand, the broad dimensions of the new urbanisation in the US can now be detected. Three of these dimensions appear to be significant and are likely to continue to characterise US urban growth for the next decade.
First, there is a return to urbanisation-but not the urbanisation of the 1950s and 1960s. New patterns of urban growth and decline are faster paced. They reflect continuing shifts in industrial structure and favour areas with diversified economies, particularly those engaged in advanced services and knowledge-based industries. Over the 1980s, recreation and retirement centres also did well. However, many small and nonmetropolitan areas, particularly in the interior part of the country, fared poorly under the adverse period influences of the 1980s, and as a result of their dependence on less than competitive industries. Growth prospects for these areas are unstable, at best, unless they can diversify their economic bases. Hence, r 742 the urban revival of the 1980s created sharper growth and decline disparities across regions and places than the urban growth of earlier decades. A second dimension of the new urban revival involves the expanded growth of the nation's minority populations-primarily Blacks, Hispanics and Asians. More immigration from Latin America and Asia along with population gains among native-born minorities has led to a strong nationwide growth advantage for minorities relative to 'majority whites'. Yet these alterations in ethnic balance play out quite differently across the geographical landscape. While it is true that minorities have dispersed more widely than in earlier decades, most of their growth is still heavily concentrated in specific regions and metropolitan areas. For example, the greater Los Angeles metropolitan area garnered more than one-fifth of all minority growth in the US during the 1980s, and just nine metropolitan areas accounted for over half of that growth. Although each of the large minority groups exhibits somewhat different geographical distribution patterns, there exists a wide majority-minority distinction in population composition across broad regions and metropolitan areas. This is bound to influence the social and political character of these areas and affect neighbourhood and community redistribution within those areas that house large minority populations.
The third major dimension of the 1980s urban revival is the continued spread of population and jobs outward from historic central cities of metropolitan areas. Although the suburban office boom was already apparent in the 1970s, it was clear that suburban territory outside central cities had become the primary locus of activity for most metropolitan residents (Cervero, 1989) . This suburban growth has resulted from both the continued relocation of activities away from northern central cities and from recent, sometimes sprawling, growth within the suburban areas of South and West metropolitan areas. Garreau's (1991) book, Edge City has popularised the notion that new suburban office and commercial complexes might serve as new central places in the modem metropolitan area. Indeed, empirical evidence supports the view that suburban areas have captured most urban employment and residential growth in the 1980s. Studies show that the typical commuter now lives and works within the suburbs, and that several suburban cities now rival their central cities in the production of export goods and services (Pisarski, 1987; Stanback, 1991) . Central cities still play an important part in metropolitan-area demographic dynamics. As a group, they are becoming even more differentiated from the remainder of the metropolitan area in their demographic compositions, as they still house a plurality of the nation's minority populations. Yet, American suburbs are also becoming more differentiated by race, class and economic function, and represent the arena of future growth in most metropolitan areas.
The sections that follow will evaluate these three broad dimensions of new urban revival in the US, based on results from the 1990 census. Although the terms 'urbanisation' and 'counter-urbanisation' have been used, these evaluations will focus on metropolitan and non-metropolitan distinctions, along with individual metropolitan areas. (See the Appendix for a discussion of the metropolitan-area definitions that are used.) In order to provide some background for our evaluation of the new urban revival, the next section reviews major explanations for the 1970s 'counter-urbanisation' phenomena in the US and their respective forecasts for the future.
Evaluating Old Explanations
Since the new urban revival can be seen as part of a general transition in redistribution processes, it is useful to view it in the light of explanations that were proposed to account for the counter-urbanisation patterns of the 1970s. First noticed as the non-metropolitan turnaround-where the non-metropolitan population grew faster than the metropolitan population Fuguitt, 1985) -, US counter-urbanisation also involved two related redistribution reversals: a redistribution down the metropolitan-size hierarchy wherein the nation's largest metropolitan areas grew more slowly than smaller-sized ones; and an accelerated regional redistribution out of the North (Northeast and Midwest census regions) towards the South and West. Together, these reversals led toward increased population flows to smaller-sized, less dense, less developed portions of the nation's spatial system (Frey and Speare, 1988) . A variety of theories was offere,d to account for these departures from previously dominant redistribution patterns. They can be generalised into three broad explanations, such that each has different implications for the future. The discussion below draws from more extensive treatments of these explanations in Frey (1987 Frey ( , 1989 .
Period Explanations
Period explanations attributed the 1970s reversals to the unique economic and demographic circumstances of tbe decade Richter, 1985; Gamick, 1988) . The oil shortage associated with the decade's energy crises prompted extensive extractive industry development in the non-metropolitan south-west, mountain West and Appalachia. Agricultural surpluses, worldwide, stemmed migration flows away from rural areas. At the same time, the decade's recessions severely reduced employment growth in northern industrial metropolitan areas-filtering low-paying manufacturing jobs to smaller communities. Some period demographic influences were also relevant. The rise of the large 'baby boom' cohorts to college age increased their populations in small college towns. Likewise, large elderly birth cohorts (born between 1910 and 1930) raised demands for small retirement communities. In sum, period explanations attributed the 1970s counterurbanisation patterns to that period's unique economic and demographic dislocations.
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Regional Restructuring Explanations
Regional restructuring explanations took a more global and transformative perspective toward the 1970s counter-urbanisation. I While acknowledging that some period influences did take place, restructuring theorists tend to see the deindustrialisation-related decline of the 1970s as a short-term episode-leading toward a new spatial organisation of production. This new spatial organisation involves expanding worldwide markets, improved communications and production technologies and, most significant, the rise of the multinational corporation. They forecasted new agglomeration tendencies for metropolitan areas that function as advanced service centres, with corporate headquarter centres, banks and similar institutions. Growth was forecast, as well, in areas with 'knowledge-based' industries. On the other hand, areas that could not make the production-to-services transformation successfully would decline. Noyelle and Stanback (1984) linked these tendencies to the rise of advanced services and the reduced role of labour-intensive manufacturing production in the national economy. Within this transformation, services are becoming 'inputs' in the production process-in knowledge-based activities like engineering, R&D and planning-and will benefit from economies agglomeration. The multi-location corporation becomes an agent in this transformation, as it both promotes division of labour across a network of places and centralises service activities in particular metropolitan areas. At the other extreme, communities that engage in routine production and consumer service activities would have unstable growth prospects since the economies of these 'off-centre' areas will be constrained by vagaries of external decisionmaking.
Deconcentration Explanations
Deconcentration explanations of counterurbanisation draw from the human ecology tradition in American sociology (Hawley, 1978; Wilson, 1984; Wardwell, 1980) . As with the regional restructuring explanation, deconcentration writers' acknowledge the effects of changing industrial structures and technological innovations. However, they place stronger emphasis on the role of residential consumer preferences in location decisions. These scholars held that, in the 1970s, long-standing residential preferences toward low-density locations became less constrained by institutional and technological barriers. They saw a convergence-across size-of-place categories-in the availability of 'urban' amenities that were previously accessible only in large places. As a result, they believed that the 1970s counter-urbanisation heralded a gradual, but long-term, shift away from urban agglomeration.
The key to this explanation is the changing role of distance in determining the social organisation of space. Both producer and consumer space will be much less constrained by the geographical limitations and transport costs of producer activities-resulting in greater locational flexibility for both firms and households (Wardwell, 1980) . Smaller communities are not seen as 'offcentre' sites for routine production activities. Rather, those with requisite amenities should attract a broad mix of residents seeking white-collar employment in firms that are deconcentrating in response to a greater competition for well-trained workers. Hence, the deconcentration perspective predicted a longterm continued dispersal of the population toward smaller communities.
Alternative Scenarios for the 1980s and 1990s
Alternative scenarios for the 1980s and 1990s are offered by each of the three explanations despite the fact that all three accounted for some of the 1970s redistribution reversals (Beale and Fuguitt, 1978; Long, 1988; Long and DeAre, 1988; Fuguitt et al., 1989; Frey, 1990) .
Period explanatiohs treated the 1970s as a distortion of long-term urbanisation patterns-implying that more traditional urbanisation tendencies should re-emerge after the decade's demographic and economic shocks subsided. South and West growth would continue but, within each region, large areas would grow at the expense of smaller ones and traditional centres of industry would again attract population. This 'return to the past' scenario assumed that no new shocks would occur in the 1980s-an assumption that turned out to be false. The regional restructuring perspective forecasted a return to urbanisation but in new locations. It viewed the metropolitan losses of the 1970s as part of long-term change in the nation's industrial structure. Population growth should occur in areas that serve as corporate headquarters and those that specialise in information and 'knowledge-based' activities. Consequently, renewed growth was predicted for northern metropolises that already held strong profiles as corporate and finance centres and for those that specialise in new industries. Weaker growth prospects were predicted for single-industry areas, especially those tied to natural resources and manufacturing. Unstable growth prospects were predicted for smaller 'off-centre' cities and non-metropolitan communities engaged in peripheral production activities.
Unlike the above explanations, deconcentration proponents predicted the continued dispersal of population away from denselysettled agglomerations.
Facilitated by changes in the nation's industrial structure, and technological improvements in communication and production, these tendencies would make both employment opportunities and urban amenities accessible to residents of small communities. This continuation of the 1970s counter-urbanisation would imply further growth for smaller-sized places particularly in the South and West.
Post-counter-urbanisation: Metro Areas and Regions
The metropolitan and regional growth patterns, that can now be observed over the 1980-90 decade, provide much stronger empirical support for the 'period' and 'regional 1960 -70 1970 -80 1980 -90 1980 -85 1985 restructuring' explanations than for the 'deconcentration' explanation presented above. The period explanation's prediction of a 'return to the past' urbanisation pattern had to be altered to take into account new 1980s forces that had strong effects in limiting small metropolitan area and nonmetropolitan area growth (Beale, 1988; Beale and Fuguitt, 1990 ). The regional restructuring explanation's predictions were most successful in characterising the growth patterns for large metropolitan areas in the 1980s. (Frey, 1990; Frey and Speare, 1992) . However, the most recent data for the decade do not bear out the deconcentration explanation ' s prediction of a broad-based, continued population dispersal (see Table 1 ).
Period influences were largely responsible for the poor population growth of nonmetropolitan areas during the 1980s (Beale, 1988) . These included two severe recessions, an overvalued dollar, and a worldwide decline in food prices early in the decadefollowed by a decline in oil prices at mid decade. Essentially the same global and cyclical forces which contributed to the 1970s population gains in manufacturing and resource-based non-metropolitan counties, shifted to turn this growth on its head during the 1980s. Manufacturing counties sustained greatest losses in the early 1980s, while agricultural-based counties did most poorly at mid-decade. The greatest shifts occurred among non-metropolitan mining counties 746 WILLIAM H. FREY where boom turned to bust between the mid and latter part of the 1980s.
Large Metropolitan Areas
While period economic influences dominated non-metropolitan declines during the 1980s, the regional restructuring explanations were more salient in explaining large metropolitan-area growth patterns. As the theory predicted, those areas with more diversified, advanced service-based economies were most able to overcome their deindustrialisation-related losses of the 1970s. Such areas as New York and Boston were in a good position to build on their existing advanced services and high-tech development bases. Areas that were still wedded to old-line manufacturing, such as Detroit, Cleveland and Pittsburgh, again displayed decade-wide declines in the 1980s (see Table 2 ). Finally, areas such as Houston and Denver, whose economies are tied heavily to the boom then bust extractive industries of the period showed fluctuating growth patterns over the decade. The different experiences of metropolitan areas with distinct economic functions are portrayed in Figure 1 .
Here, New York and Los Angeles, areas with strong international corporate and trading linkages, rebounded steadily from their 1970s growth slowdowns. (New York's population gains became reduced in the latter part of the decade due to sharp turndowns in the financial services and real estate.) For Detroit, an automotive centre, the early 1980s constituted the nadir of the industrial 'shakeout' -coincident with the rising dollar and reductions in exports. Denver's pattern is consistent with many areas linked to oil and extractive industry bases where substantial early decade population gains turned to sharp slowdowns as those industries encountered mid-decade shocks.
While individual large metropolitan areas exhibited growth and decline patterns-consistent with the regional restructuring explanation-large metropolitan areas, on the whole, rebounded from their 1970s declines and fared better than non-metropolitan areas. Nevertheless, there are strong regional variations which are consistent with the regional restructuring and period explanations discussed above.
Regional Variations
The national trend toward 1980s reurbanisation was accompanied by a small deceleration of redistribution to the South and West. Although 1980s South and West regional growth continued to outpace that of the North by a considerable degree, the differential has diminished-particularly for the South and particularly for the last half of the 1980s (see Table 1 ). The largest 1970s-to1980s reductions in Sunbelt growth levels occurred in the smaller and non-metropolitan areas of the South and West regions. These are the areas that contributed the most to Sunbe1t gains.in the 1970s. Non-metropolitan areas also showed declines in the North but this region's largest metropolitan areas rebounded slightly from their 1970s declines-producing a small increase in that region's decade-wide growth. Clearly, the strong 1970s draws of small Sunbelt places diminished over the 1980s and large northern metropolises benefited from regional restruturing influences.
These region and metropolitan size growth disparities are sharpened even further when a coastal-interior dichotomy is drawn within each region.2 In both the South and West, the 1980s small and non-metropolitan declines were concentrated in the interior-where many single-industry and resource-based communities are located. Similar declines are shown for non-metropolitan areas of the interior (midwest) portions of the North for communities specialising in agriculture and manufacturing. In contrast, the greatest regional restructuring-generated gains occurred within large metropolitan areas located in the coastal portions of these regions. These areas have historic strengths as trade, finance and recreation centres (Frey and Speare, 1992) . The coastal-interior patterns are evident in Figures 2-4 which contrast growth patterns of large metropolitan areas with those of ;c .. :-:-:.:-:-:
'.' non-metropolitan areas in both parts of each regIOn.
The Rural Renaissance
The continued 'rural renaissance' predicted by deconcentration proponents did not come into fruition. Underlying this explanation was the view that residents could now actualise well-documented preferences for non-metropolitan locations. However, the hard economic realities of the 1980s, discussed above, did not permit this to occur for most of the population and for most nonmetropolitan counties. There were, however, two notable exceptions.
One of these involves the continued growth of non-metropolitan retirement counties (Beale, 1988; Beale and Fuguitt, 1990; Frey, 1992a) . These counties grew faster than non-metropolitan counties with other economic functions, and faster than the overall national population for most of the 1970s and 1980s. While concentrated in Florida, they are located in amenity-laden areas in all parts of the US. Their growth provides evidence that 'footloose' populations-like the retired elderly-are apt to select nonmetropolitan residential locations when their preferences are not constrained by workplace considerations. Moreover, by attracting large numbers of elderly movers, with substantial discretionary incomes, these non-metropolitan counties will generate increased employment for younger, labour-force-aged persons in service, construction and other complementary industries.
A second type of non-metropolitan county that should sustain continued growth over the 1980s is the so-called exurban county that lies adjacent to the metropolitan area. Residents selecting these counties tend to hold a preference for living close to, but not inside, a major urban centre (Zuiches, 1981; Fuguitt and Brown, 1990) . Many of the faster-growing exurban counties may, later, be subsumed by an expanding metropolitan area (Fuguitt et al., 1989) but still retain a largely rural or non-metropolitan character. The continued gains of retirement and exurban counties, alone, will not revive the 'rural renaissance' predicted during the 1970s. That prediction failed to disentangle a mix of period, regional restructuring and , . Coastal ..,.,.,.,.,-: ,.,.,.,.,.,.,.,.,.:-,.,.,.:-,.,.,.,., :-j'.:-' :. deconcentration influences that served to provide an illusion that a new era of settlement dispersion had begun. Yet, the 1980s return to urbanisation is clearly not a return to the urban patterns observed during the 1950s and the 1960s. The interplay of regional restructuring and period influences on employment and residential movement patterns continues to rearrange the spatial patterns of growth and decline across regions and individual metropolitan areas.
Minority-Majority Growth Disparities
A second signature of US urbanisation during the 1980s is the disparate shifts of the White 'majority population' and those of race and ethnic minorities. The nation's racial and ethnic minority groups are becoming a continually stronger influence on population redistribution patterns. Largely the result of changing immigration levels and origins (Jensen, 1989; Bean et al., 1990; Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1990) , the combined minority population (including Hispanics and races other than White) grew more than seven times as fast as the non-Hispanic White 'majority' population over the 1980s. 3 The number of Asians more than doubled during that time from 3.5 million to over 7 million. Hispanics increased by more than half-from 14.6 to 22.3 million. Blacks, numerically the largest minority, added 3.5 million to their population over the 1980s, reaching a total count of almost 30 million. As a result of these increases, the minority population is now composed of 60.5 million people-almost a quarter (24.4 per cent) of the total population. Yet, these minorities are hardly distributed evenly across the national landscape. Historically, immigrants have tended to settle in either traditional 'port-ofentry' areas or where large concentrations of their ethnic group were already located (Farley and Allen 1987; Bean and Tienda, 1987; Long, 1988; Cromartie and Stack, 1989; McHugh, 1989; Johnson and Roseman, 1990) . Native-born minorities have mainly travelled well-worn migration paths, where the chance to be near friends and family often took precedence over economic opportunities. Although these stereotypes have shifted slightly during the 1980s, minority redistribution patterns are still quite different from those of the white majority. Such distinctive minority-majority patterns are likely to continue throughout the 1990s and lead to widening disparities between the racial and ethnic compositions of regions, metropolitan areas and communities.
Disparities by Region and Metropolitan Size
Distinctions between the majority-minority compositions of broad regions and metropolitan categories can be seen in the results of the 1990 census. Whites constitute about three-quarters of the nation's population and represent almost that share (72 per cent) in the South. The proportion of Whites, however, increases to 83 per cent in the North and drops to 67 per cent in the West. In large metropolitan areas (having populations greater than 1 million) in the West, the White share sinks to only 63 per cent. This contrasts sharply with the non-metropolitan North, where Whites make up 96 per cent of the population. Even greater disparities among individual metropolitan areas and non-metropolitan communities are camouflaged by these patterns. What stands out about the 1980s is the way in which minority-majority growth patterns served to accentuate these differences. The largest minority gains took place in the rapidly-growing West region and in large metropolitan areas, where minority populations grew by 59 per cent-almost twice the national minority rate (see Table 3 ). Each of the nation's three largest minority groups is contributing to this pattern. Blacks and Hispanics made the largest gains in the West, and all three minorities registered their greatest gains in large metropolitan areas. The three differ in some respects, however. Hispanic gains are concentrated most heavily in the largest Sunbelt metropolitan areas, which serve as most frequent destinations of Mexican immigrants. The greatest Asian gains occurred in large metropolitan areas in all three regions where better-educated, skilled Asian immigrants are responding to mainstream -employment opportunities. Blacks, breaking past migration patterns are leaving large northern metropolises for large metropolitan areas in the South and communities of all sizes in the West. These changes point to the rise of more Blacks into the middle class where they are following migration patterns more consistent with those of the White majority. However, there is also a strong element of return migration among less well-off Blacks relocating nearer the VI tv
Asians by region and metropolitan categories Non-Hispanic whites All minorities Blacks Hispanics Asians 1980 Asians -90 1980 Asians -90 1980 Asians -90 1980 Asians -90 1980 Asians -90 1980 South (Cromartie and Stack, 1989; Johnson and Roseman, 1990) .
Notwithstanding these differences among Blacks, Hispanics and Asians, the three minorities, as a group, differ sharply in distribution from the majority White population across regions and metropolitan area categories (see Figures 5 and 6 ). Nearly half of the White population is located in the North, and over half is located outside the nation's largest metropolitan areas. Less than a third of the minority population is located in the North, and almost two-thirds are located in large metropolitan areas. These majority-minority differences widened during the 1980s.
The disparities increased because the White population grew more slowly than the minority population and showed fewer disparities across geographical categories. A modest shift of Whites took place from the North to the Sunbelt during the 1980s, in response to the employment dislocations associated with various boom and bust areas discussed earlier. There were also sharplydirected flows of elderly Whites to selected retirement communities. Thus, growth gains for US Whites were more modest and more evenly distributed across the South and West than minority gains.
Disparities across Metropolitan Areas
Across individual metropolitan areas, the minority and majority growth patterns observed across regions and metropolitan categories are even more accentuated. This becomes apparent when one compares those areas with the greatest absolute increases in the White majority population over the 1980s with those showing the greatest increases in minorities (see Table 4 ). The former areas, representing strong economic magnets of the 1980s, are attracting Whites in search of employment opportunities. The latter areas are in the nation's largest 'port-of-entry' metropolitan areas for immigrants and areas with very strong concentrations of minorities. Two other items are worth noting: among the five metropolitan areas on each list there is no overlap; and all five of the top minority gainers show greater increases than the top White gainer. The distinctive minority and majority metropolitan-area growth patterns for the 1980s can be characterised as follows.
Whites' moderate gains and declines. As the White population was not infused by a large immigration from abroad, internal migration yielded gains for some metropolitan areas and losses for others. The White population in five metropolitan areas grew by more than 300 000 (shown in Out of the 89 metropolitan areas that lost majority Whites, five lost more than 100 000 and 31 lost more than 10 000. New York lost the most ( -856 000), followed by Chicago ( -190 ( -173 000) and Cleveland (-107 000).
Other large metropolitan areas (Miami, Milwaukee and Boston) also lost White population. Of the smaller areas where the White population declined, the majority were located in the 'rustbelt' or 'oilpatch' regions, midwest farming areas, and western mining areas. Nevertheless, 32 of the 89 metropolitan areas that lost majority Whites gained in total population. The most striking example is New York, where a gain of 1.4 million minorities more than offset its White losses.
To a large extent, patterns of White metropolitan growth and decline are consistent with the snowbelt-sun belt, interior-coastal patterns for the total population discussed earlier. The White population, more than the minority population does, responds to economic pushes and pulls across labour markets.
Minorities' concentrated gains. Minority populations grew in all but eight of the nation's metropolitan areas over the 1980s, but the bulk of this growth took place in a handful of areas.
Twenty per cent of the nation's 1980s population growth-representing a 2.8 million minority gain-took place in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, the home of 12 per cent of the nation's total minority population. The five top gainers (shown in Table 4 ange
a Central cities and suburbs (remainder of metropolitan territory) as defined by OMB, 30 June 1990. Source: US Decennial Censuses reported by Forstall (1991) . minority populations by more than 300 000 during the 1980s. Excepting San Diego, eight of these nine are among the areas that contain the highest minority total populations in 1990. These nine together accounted for 43 per cent of the nation's total population and for 54 per cent of the nation's 1980s population growth. All served as port-of-entry areas for new immigrants or were traditionally Black areas. In all but one (Dallas-Ft Worth), minorities constituted over half of the overall population gain in the 1980s; and in each, minorities accounted for well above the national average proportion of total 1990 populations.
Nevertheless, a second echelon of 11 areas gained between 100 000 and 300 000 minorities in the 1980s. Several of these (Atlanta, Phoenix, Sacramento, Seattle, Orlando and Tampa-St Petersburg) have smaller minority populations than the nine largest gainers, with the better part of their total gain coming from non-minority Whites.
In spite of the widening distribution of the minority population over the 1980s, minority growth is mainly still concentrated in those areas inhabited by large numbers of minorities over a decade ago. The effect of minority growth being so concentrated is that minority composition varies widely across US areas. Ten metropolitan areas are occupied by 'minority-majorities' (the 'minority' population is greater than onehalf). Among these are five small and moderate-sized metropolitan areas near the Mexican border, in addition to Honolulu, Las Cruces, San Antonio, Miami and Los Angeles. Another 69 metropolitan areas with minority shares of over one-quarter are largely in the Southeast, Southwest and Pacific Coast states, together with a few large metropolitan areas on the northern and eastern seaboards.
In the vast majority (201) of the nation's metropolitan areas, however, less than 25 per cent populations belong to minorities (see Figure 7 ). In 97 of these, the minority share is below 10 per cent. These majority-dominated metropolitan areas are located mainly in the Northeast-west of the eastern seaboard, in the midwest, and in the upper northern-most mountain and Pacific states.
, . Both Hispanics and Asians, in contrast with Blacks, are much more heavily concentrated in large metropolitan areas. The nine most heavily Hispanic metropolitan areas house 58 per cent of the nation's Hispanic population (Los Angeles alone contains 21 per cent). The four areas with over half a million Asians house slightly over half of the US Asian population. Furthermore, the portof-entry status of Los Angeles, Miami, Houston and Dallas (for Hispanics) and Los Angeles, San Francisco and New York (for Asians) ensures that minority growth and concentration in them will continue to be high.
However, the spread of these groups is shown by the fact that 29 metropolitan areas had more than 100 000 Hispanics in 1990 (up from 22 in 1980), with high levels of growth displayed in areas like Washington DC, Boston, Phoenix, Orlando and TampaSt Petersburg. The number of areas with Asian populations of greater than 100 000 had risen to 12 by 1990 (up from five in 1980). High Asian growth rates are characterised in the majority of the nation's metropolitan areas (from small population bases). Thus, these populations have both spread and remained concentrated. Areas with the most Hispanics tend to be in the West and in Texas. Only two metropolitan areas have Asian populations higher than 10 per cent-Honolulu (62.9 per cent) and San Francisco (14.8 per cent).
The minority population explosion-both native and immigrant-is contributing to a much more diverse national population. However, the trends for regions and metropolitan 'areas show that sharp disparities have emerged. Some parts of the country such as smaller communities in the North and Midwest are becoming increasingly 'whiter' and older than the overall population. Growing multicultural port-of-entry metropolitan areas, on the other hand, are becoming demographically very different. If current trends go on, the majority-minority polarisation across regions, areas and communities will intensify. Moreover, intra-metropolitan concerns regarding residential segregation, multi-lingual education, and political representation will be heightened in those parts of the country that have served as magnets for minorities.
Within the Metropolitan Area
Over the past 20 years, the demographic dynamics between central cities and their suburbs have been altered. In the same way that the 1970s represented a transition decade for the nation's regional and metropolitan population shifts, a transition in the central city-suburb redistribution dynamic also occurred within metropolitan areas (Frey and Spear, 1988) . The slowdown in metropolitanwide growth produced lower rates of suburbanisation than in the 1950s and 1960s
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(see Table 5 ), and the central cities of these areas bore the brunt of the metropolitan-wide decline. During that decade, several central cities-St Louis, Buffalo, Cleveland and Detroit-lost more than one-fifth of their populations. These patterns have had mixed effects on central cities. As Black suburbanisation began in earnest and as pockets of white gentrification evolved in some of the more cosmopolitan cities, the strong racial and social-status selectivity, that had typified the massive immediate post-war suburbanisation, began to dissipate slightly. Consequently, the pattern of 'Black cityWhite suburb' showed some signs' of weakening, though not sufficiently to prevent the emergence of pockets of ghetto poverty.
Although the last decade has brought a continuing slowdown in the rate of overall suburban growth, the majority of the nation's. metropolitan population (63 per cent) already resides in the suburbs where some of the fastest-growing individual communities are located. This raises the question of the future role of historic central cities, especially those located in larger metropolitan areas. Recent patterns indicate that some will become specialised, gentrified 'nodes' within larger multi-centred metropolitan areas. Nevertheless, many central cities will become racially diversified as growing concentrations of the new immigrant and minority groups begin to inhabit them.
City-Suburb Distinctions
The declines and growth slow-downs many large cities sustained during the 1970s were attenuated by the 1980s rises in metropolitan growth. Table 6 , which shows trends for the dominant central cities and suburbs of the nation's 25 largest metropolitan areas, makes this clear. Four of the 18 central cities that lost population during the 1970s (New York, Boston, San Francisco-Oakland and Seattle) made gains in the 1980s, and all but one (Denver) of the other 14 displayed reduced losses. At the same time, four of the growing 1970s central cities (Houston, Miami, Tampa-St Petersburg, Phoenix) showed diminished gains in the 1980s. All of these are located in Sunbelt areas that sustained reduced metropolitan-wide 1980s growth.
There are two main reasons why the larger central cities have recovered from their 1970s losses. One involves the economic functions some of these cities serve, which fit with secular patterns of corporate growth and associated advanced service industries during the 1980s. Cities that function as headquarters for corporations and related FIRE (finance, insurance and real estate) industries tended to gain in employment and population for much of the decade. An example of this is New York, where the many employment opportunities caused the metropolitan area's population growth to become strongly concentrated there (particularly within Manhattan). At the same time, cities located within metropolitan areas where such industries are less prominent, or less centralised, did not rebound as well. (Detroit is a good example of this.)
A second ongoing source of growth in large cities is the accelerated immigration to prominent ports-of-entry. US minorities immigrating to the US are more likely to locate in the central city than the rest of the population. Consequently, large immigrant streams to areas like Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco and Miami augmented the growth of central cities as well as their diversity.
The Urban Concentration of Minorities
During the 1950s and 1960s, the 'Black cityWhite Suburbs' image of many metropolitan areas resulted from substantial 'White flight' of the period, as well as the ongoing Black migration to largely city-only destinations. Current city-suburb racial patterns are far more diverse than during those decades for two reasons.
First, the rising inflow of new immigrant populations, especially Hispanic and Asians, has significantly increased racial and ethnic diversity in many of the largest central cities and their suburbs. As previously stated, these groups tend to congregate in certain metropolitan areas and are more likely to reside in the central cities of those areas than are the majority Whites.
Second, a small but detectable Black suburbanisation movement began in the 1970s. This was facilitated by better economic circumstances for Blacks and a significant reduction in the levels of racial discrimination in the housing market prompted by the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. This slight suburbanisation has not been enough to erase decades of racial residential separation, and high levels of community and neighbourhood segregation still exist between Blacks and Whites. Nevertheless, the pattern of Black suburbanisation has taken root, to a greater degree in some areas than in others (Frey, 1992b) . Table 7 illustrates the city-suburb dynamic of majority-minority shifts within the nation's largest metropolitan areas. These data show clearly that 'White flight' was alive and well in the 1980s. All but three of these central cities lost majority Whites during the decade, though the losses were greatest in northern and selected southern cities. Detroit's 47 per cent loss of Whites led that of all other cities by a wide margin.
These data also reveal that minority populations were mainly responsible for the stronger central city showings in the 1980s. All but five central cities of these large metropolitan areas gained minorities during the 1980s. Substantial minority gains in Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, Boston. Dallas-Ft Worth, Houston and Seattle significantly altered these cities' demographic growth patterns. However, it is also worth noting that the rates of minority growth in the suburbs are considerably higher than those in the cities. Although these higher suburban growth rates represent smaller aggregate numbers (due to the often tiny suburban minority population bases). they reveal a continued suburbanisation of minorities in large metropolitan areas.
These selective majority and minority population changes have had the overall effect of perpetuating the difference between the central cities' minority make-up and that of the remainder of the metropolitan area (see panel 1 in Table 7 ). Minority populations are generally much larger in central cities than in their surrounding suburbs. This is less clearcut in western metropolises containing more sprawling, over-bounded central cities, but it is quite distinct in most northern and southern metropolitan areas. Eleven of these metropolitan central cities are composed of 'majority-minorities '-led by Miami (88 per cent), Detroit (80· per cent) and Atlanta (73 per cent). None of the surrounding suburbs has a minority proportion that high, though t4e multi-ethnic suburban areas surrounding Miami and Los Angeles are approaching 'majority-minority' status.
Have the redistribution patterns of the 1980s distinguished central cities from their suburbs even more? The data in the last panel of Table 7 reveal mixed patterns across metropolit~areas. Racial disparities between their cities and suburbs increased in all large northern metropolitan areas, though these increases are mostly modest. The largest increases occurred in Detroit as a result of its continued substantial 'White flight', and in Milwaukee, where new minority gains are heavily concentrated in the city. In the West, the experience of large metropolitan areas is quite different with absolute disparity indices being much lower than those for the North, and the changes over the 1980s are relatively modest.
Most interesting are the decade shifts among large Southern metropolitan areas. Four of these areas show modest increases in disparity, the results of both White suburban flight and minority city gains. Washington DC, Atlanta and Miami, however, are three notable exceptions. These areas showed some of the highest disparities in 1980 and sharp declines since then. Washington DC's decline resulted from its continued attraction of middle-class Whites to already-gentrified sections. The city's minority population simultaneously decreased, largely through Black suburbanisation into neighbouring Prince George County, but also through dispersed relocation of all minorities to different parts of the metropolitan area. In losing minorities and gaining central city Whites. 1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1960-70 1970-80 1980- The majority-minority shifts just described camouflage slightly different patterns among different racial and ethnic groups. The patterns for the individual groups-Hispanics, Blacks and Asians-are summarised for metropolitan areas with populations over 1 million in Table 8 . For the most part, they show Blacks to be much more concentrated in central cities than Hispanics and Asians, and Asians to be the least concentrated of the three groups. City-suburb separation by race and ethnicity is clearly much lower in the West than in the North and South. As Blacks dominate northern metropolitan minority populations, overall majority-minority disparities are highest in northern metropolitan areas and have widened the most since 1980. City-suburb majority-minority disparities are smallest in western metropolitan areas and have increased little over the 1980s. This is worth noting because western metropolitan areas have grown the most as a result of recent Latin American and Asian immigration.
While city-suburb racial disparities deserve attention, it is also significant that all three major minorities-Blacks, Hispanics and Asians-are suburbanising in all regions of the country. Different mixes of minorities and different historical growth patterns have caused minority residential changes across communities and neighbourhoods within the suburbs to take different forms in different regions. For example, some West and Southwest metropolitan areas, with multi-racial mixes, show lower levels of neighbourhood segregation as a result of new dynamic transition patterns and 'majority-minority' suburban cities. On the other hand, a few old northern areas continue to display 1950s style Black city concentration and White suburban flight (a good example is Detroit).
These different scenarios suggest that new contexts for significant racial change will develop within the suburbs of the nation's sprawling metropolises. How these patterns get played out will have a long-term effect on the economic, social and political development of communities that are now just evolving.
City Poverty
Since the 1970s, there has been a widespread elimination of central-city manufacturing employment opportunities that used to serve 'social upgrading' functions for recent immigrant and minority city residents. This has led to increased~mismatches' between the skill levels and employment opportunities ayailable to inner-city minorities, and increases in the levels of joblessness and poverty. According to some, this separation of employment opportunities is compounded by a selective out-migration of city minorities-leading to a spatial separation of middle-and working-class minorities from more poveI:ty-prone minorities, left behind in the city. (Kasarda, 1988) . Others argue that racial discrimination in housing exacerbates inner city minority poverty (Massey and Denton, 1993) .
Although these circumstances represent important concerns for a growing number of individuals that reside in 'pockets of poverty' within large metropolitan areas, there are two misconceptions that are often held pertaining to city poverty. One of these is that most of the poverty population in the US resides within the central cities of large metropolitan areas. The second is that a substantial proportion of central-city residents are minority populations that are living in poverty. Neither of these suppositions is valid.
A study of 1980 poverty distributions indicates that fewer than 30 per cent of the nation's poverty population resides in the largest central cities (Bane and Jargowsky, 1988) . This is the case for less than 20 per cent of the nation's non-Hispanic white US poor, although almost half of the nation's Black and Hispanic poor live in large cities. The remainder of the poverty population resides either in the suburbs of these large metropolitan areas, in smaller metropolitan areas, and in rural or non-metropolitan America.
The composition of the largest central Certainly, the plight of the growing 'underclass' minority populations is not to be dismissed. The social and economic isolation that has befallen the inhabitants of concentrated poverty neighbourhoods is leading to severe economic consequences for these households and their children. The problems are amplified in individual metropolitan areas which house large percentages of minority and immigrant groups. Yet the residents of these concentrated poverty neighbourhoods comprise a relatively small share of all city poverty households. Bane and Jargowsky (1988) estimate that about 9 per cent of poor Whites and 35 per cent of poor Blacks live in such concentrated poverty neighbourhoods. Moreover, the majority of the nation's concentrated poverty households reside in just 10 of the nation's largest central cities.
Baby-boom Suburbanisation
One hope for city revitalisation that was held by many urban analysts in the 1970s, was the presumption that the large babyboom cohorts-then ascending into their household-formation ages-would show an increasing preference for cities as residential locations. This hope was based on two premises. First, that baby-boom cohorts, like most earlier cohorts, would tend to prefer a central-city residence, at least at the early stage of the life-course. Central cities have traditionally been seen as 'staging areas' for young adults before marriage and the childbearing ages. Secondly, it was anticipated that the baby-boom cohorts-more so than earlier cohorts-would be likely to stay in the city beyond the early adult years. This expectation rests on the observation that these cohorts delayed marriage and childbearing to a greater extent than did older generations. It was also thought that the cultural amenities and professional and service employment opportunities, located in central Cities, would appeal to more affluent babyboomers as they aged into their 30s and 40s.
The evidence of the 1970s suggests that boomer-initiated 'gentrification' was less pervasive than first anticipated (Nelson, 1988) . Yet the sheer volume of babyboomers who grew up in, or were attracted to, central' cities served to stave off even greater declines than were already observed in the larger industrial cities (Frey and Speare, 1988) . As the 1980s came to an end, the majority of baby-boom cohort members had already reached their 30s and early 40s.
What can now be stated about the citysuburb locations of adult baby-boomers as they reach the more residentially-stable portions of their life-course? Data from the late 1980s show that the city-suburb location of adult baby-boomers does not differ from the city-suburb distribution of older adult households, within the nation's largest metropolitan areas (data compiled from the March 1988 Current Population Survey of the Bureau of the US Census) . These data also show that it is the more affluent baby-boomer households (those in the upper 30 income percentile) that are primarily responsible for the greater suburban relocation of all babyboomers. Non-affluent baby-boomers in these large metropolitan areas are fairly equally distributed between the central cities and the suburbs, while the well-off boomers are more than twice as likely to locate in the suburbs than the city. This tendency is particularly evident among the older of the baby-boom generations (Frey, 1992c) .
So, the hope that large numbers of 'yuppie' baby-boomers might serve to reinvigorate the nation's largest central cities seems to have been misplaced. Certainly there are pockets of gentrification within most of the largest central cities. Such pockets are more plentiful within more cosmopolitan urban centres, such as San Francisco or Washington DC. But it appears that the large baby-boom cohorts have followed the patterns of earlier generations in relocating to the suburbs as they have reached their more mature adult ages, and as their incomes have risen.
The Suburban Metropolis
The better part of the nation's urban population now resides in the suburbs. While the city-suburb growth dynamic has diminished in recent decades, redistribution across communities within the suburbs has increased. Both spatial and demographic change contribute to the continued growth of suburbs. Spatial change accompanies the outward spread of population, ultimately resulting in a reclassification of territory from rural to urban. Along with this, many individual suburban communities have experienced extremely high rates of growth. During the 1980s, 17 of the 25 fastest-growing communities (with populations greater than 100 000) were suburban (see Table 9 ). Suburbs--currently classed as such by federal statistical definitions-are now much more than mere adjunct clusters of bedroom communities. Over the 1970s and 1980s, these areas have developed into the dominant activity space for metropolitan populations and are rapidly becoming primary locations for metropolitan economies. It is clear that since 1970, employment suburbanisation, which followed residential suburbanisation, has accelerated both in scope and in character. During the 1970s, the balance of metropolitan jobs moved from the central city to the suburbs in many older areas. Also during this decade, the suburbanisation of non-manufacturing jobs in these older areas outpaced that of manufacturing jobs (Frey and Speare, 1988) . Many whitecollar office and service-industry jobs heralded the beginning of the 'suburban office boom' (Cervero, 1989) .
In the past two decades, suburban employment gains have been associated with a new era of metropolitan economic development in which competition has developed between suburban employment centres and historical central cities. Stanback (1991) , in a recent study of selected large metropolitan areas, finds that many communities have undertaken service activities previously concentrated in the central city such as wholesaling and business-related services. Other suburbs, labelled 'suburban magnet' areas, contain high-tech and office complexes, sales centres, divisional offices and, sometimes, headquarters for large corporations. These 'suburban magnet areas' are surrounded by hotels, retail and entertainment complexes located with ready highway access to other parts of the metropolitan area.
Recent studies undertaken in a variety of metropolitan areas show a rise in 'suburbonly' activity spaces as a result of the suburban spread of employment and development since 1970 (Hartshorn and Muller, 1986; Cervero, 1989; Garreau, 1991) . The majority of residents in many large metropolitan areas both live and work in the suburbs (Pisarski, 1987; Frey and Speare, 1988) . Meanwhile, central-city employers are becoming more dependent than ever on commuters from suburbs to fill positions that require higher education and skills (Stanback, 1991) .
The continued suburban expansion of population, the post-1970 spread of employment, and the more recent suburban relocation of many minorities points the way to an increasingly heterogeneous suburban territory becoming the more dominant portion of the metropolitan area. Within this territory, suburban communities show disparate patterns of growth and decline, racial and ethnic transition patterns, land-use mixes, and associated planning and governance issues which argue for a focus on intra-suburban demographic changes over the next 10 years. For expansive suburban communities encom- Figure 9 indicates that the very highest rates of growth took place in the outer counties of these PMSAs-showing an increasing gradient of outer population growth. This growth has been begun to extend into adjacent metropolitan areas. The spreading of minorities across the more suburban PMSAs of the New York region is also shown here. Of the 19 counties that lie outside the city of New York, 11 showed a pattern of minority gain and nonminority White loss. These counties are located within the inner PMSAs including Jersey City (NJ), Newark (NJ), Bergen-Passaic (NJ), Stamford (CT) and also include two suburban counties (Weschester and Rockland) within the New York PMSA. Both minority and majority populations grew in the remaining suburban counties, where minority growth was always higher. However, more dramatic shifts in the innercounties led to the outward gradient in minority composition indicated in Figure 10 . Other characteristics of households and housing for the New York region's PMSAs indicate that only the outermost portions of this region conform to earlier stereotypes of suburbia. These outer areas, as of 1990, have high rates of growth, low percentages of minorities and greater than average shares of children, married couples and owned homes. However, the much larger part of New York's regional population, which lies outside the central city, displays a wide range of demographic and housing characteristics.
All major metropolitan areas show similar patterns of suburban growth. In fact, the pace and nature of these changes is even more dramatic in areas where both immigration and internal migration (such as in Los Angeles or San Francisco) are contributing to increases in minority and majority populations. While this is not the case in many central cities, it is still possible to influence the direction of suburban development in these fast-growing areas. Hence, close attention needs to be paid to the emerging dynamics of demographic change across the nation's suburban territory.
Conclusion
The new urban revival in the US represents a return to urbanisation after the counterurbanisation phenomenon of the 1970s. However, it is not a return to the traditional urbanisation that characterised the immediate post-World War II decades. The new urbanisation is unique, less for the geographical patterns of growth it will generate than for I _115+ 1··.",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,1 5-15 .}::::~r~:~~~~~~~~fJi#:~J _0-5 _ Minus Figure 9 . Percentage population change, 1980-90, for counties located in the New York CMSA and its component PMSAs.
the pace at which these patterns will change and the processes that underlie them. The geography of employment opportunities is now strongly connected to both national and international forces that are subject to unprecedented change. This is facilitated by continuing improvements in telecommunications and production technologies which permit employers and residents to respond quickly in their relocation patterns. Hence, the specific geographical patterns of urban growth, observed during the 1980s, may change markedly over the next decade or two. Yet, the underlying processes associated with post-1970s counter-urbanisation will remain intact. While subject to change, there were several noteworthy aspects to the geographical patterns of 1980s urban and regional growth in the US. One of these is the decline in the growth levels for non-metropolitan areas, excepting retirement areas and those that lie adjacent to growing metropolitan regions. There were also noteworthy gains experienced by the nation's largest metropolitan areas, particularly those located in the coastal parts of the US. Yet the fluidity of the growth and decline patterns is well illustrated by the boom-and-bust experiences for several areas, of all sizes, between the early 1980s and the late 1980s. Growth in the nation's Sunbelt region became. attenuated during the last part of the decade, especially in its interior portions.
Both the geographical and temporal patterns of 1980s urban growth give credence to the regional restructuring and period explanations that were put forth earlier in this article. The renewed growth in moderate and large-sized metropolitan areas is clearly related to industrial transformations in the nation's economy. The most consistent , . the pace at which these patterns will change and the processes that underlie them. The geography of employment opportunities is now strongly connected to both national and international forces that are subject to unprecedented change. This is facilitated by continuing improvements in telecommunications and production technologies which permit employers and residents to respond quickly in their relocation patterns. Hence, the specific geographical patterns of urban growth, observed during the 1980s, may change markedly over the next decade or two. Yet, the underlying processes associated with post-1970s counter-urbanisation will remain intact. While subject to change, there were several noteworthy aspects to the geographical patterns of 1980s urban and regional growth in the US. One of these is the decline in the growth levels for non-metropolitan areas, excepting retirement areas and those that lie adjacent to growing metropolitan regions. There were also noteworthy gains experienced by the nation's largest metropolitan areas, particularly those located in the coastal parts of the US. Yet the fluidity of the growth and decline patterns is well illustrated by the boom-and-bust experiences for several areas, of all sizes, between the early 1980s and the late 1980s. Growth in the nation's Sunbelt region became. attenuated during the last part of the decade, especially in its interior portions.
Both the geographical and temporal patterns of 1980s urban growth give credence to the regional restructuring and period explanations that were put forth earlier in this article. The renewed growth in moderate and large-sized metropolitan areas is clearly related to industrial transformations in the nation's economy. The most consistent growth occurred in areas that served as advanced service and corporate headquarter centres, those that specialised in knowledgebased industries, and those that engaged in certain high-tech activities. Slower growth and declines occurred in areas that were tied to old-line manufacturing or declining industries, or that had heavily invested in activities subject to cyclical influences.
Two other dimensions of the 1980s urban revival will be a part of the urban redistribution pattern for the foreseeable future. One of these involves the distinct growth of and change in the distribution patterns of the nation's minority populations. Minorities make up about one quarter of the total population, but they constitute significantly greater shares of the populations in specific metropolitan areas and in the South and West regions. This is because most Hispanic and Asian growth is still heavily concentrated in well-known port-of-entry metropolitan areas that already house large numbers of them. In contrast, the redistribution of non-minority Whites is driven by internal migration in response to labour market 'pushes' and 'pulls', as well as directed flows of the elderly population to selected retirement communities. Blacks, still the nation's largest minority, lie somewhere in between. Largely driven by internal migration, their redistribution patterns are becoming more like those of Whites, but their populations are still heavily concentrated in traditional South region and northern metropolis locations.
The population distribution disparities between non-minority Whites, and the combined minority population have intensified over the 1980s decade. Current redistribution processes suggest that this will ------------~-----------------------------------------TIlE NEW URBAN REVIVAL IN TIlE US 771 continue, leading to wide differences across regions in demographic characteristics, ranging from age structure, income characteristics, and dominant racial or ethnic identification. At its extreme, one can envisage a contrast between ageing, White small communities in the nation's mid-section, and young, vibrant, multi-cultural populations in large metropolises on the east and west coasts.
The final dimension of the new urban revival that is likely to continue is the increasing dominance of the suburbs as the 'locus of activity' for both residents and workers of the metropolitan area. The majority of the US metropolitan population already resides in the suburbs and this is especially the case for non-minority Whites. Still, the suburban population is becoming increasingly more diverse in a wide range of racial, income and housing characteristics. This will continue to represent a challenge for planners and government agencies involved with the co-ordination of services and transport networks across this diverse set of places. The other side of the challenge concerns the question of what role the historic central city can playas its population size and economic influence become diminished. For a subset of these central cities, the challenge is compounded by the existence of a large and growing concentrated poverty population that increases as a result of selective immigration, internal migration and non-migration of less-well-off segments of the population.
Each of these aspects of the new urban revival is likely to continue, in some form, over the next several decades. The new contexts of redistribution, established during the 'transition decade' of the 1970s will ensure that the rates of growth and decline across communities, regions and metropolitan areas will be sharper than in the past, as a result of more immediate responses to national and global economic circumstances. Yet, population redistribution patterns will continue to be distinct for different racial and ethnic groups. The disparities that appear to be emerging across regions and metropolitan areas, as well as within the expanding metropolis, raise concerns about equity in access to jobs, housing, schools and social services. Hence, the new urban revival in the United States poses both opportunities and challenges associated with an urban system that has become more interconnected and responsive to global economic change, while becoming more sharply differentiated internally.
Notes
